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PHILLIPS V. COOK
Scope Of Employment: Driving Home
In Company Vehicles
Phillips v. Cook'
Harris and Phillips, defendants in this personal injury action,
were partners in a used car business. Harris was driving home by the
most direct route, in an automobile belonging to the partnership and
bearing dealer plates, when he negligently collided with the plaintiff.
Under their oral partnership arrangement, Harris was authorized to
use partnership vehicles for transportation to and from his home so
that, when the occasion arose, he would be able to demonstrate or sell
the vehicle and otherwise conduct partnership business after leaving
the lot at night and before returning the next day. The car he was
driving was for sale at any time, although when the accident occurred,
there was no evidence that the car bore any sign or advertisement
other than the dealer tags which would indicate this. Further,
although Harris had no regular hours, no conclusive evidence was
adduced that tended to show he had planned to conduct business after
arriving home on the date of the accident. The jury found that Harris
was acting within the ordinary course of the business of the partner-
ship, and both defendants were accordingly held jointly and severally
liable. Harris did not challenge the trial court's finding. On appeal,
the other partner, defendant Phillips, contended that there was not
sufficient evidence on which a jury could find that Harris was acting
within the scope of partnership business at the time of the accident.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a 5-2 decision, held that there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding, since the facts
indicated that the use of the car by Harris was beneficial and incidental
to the partnership arrangement.
The liability of a partnership for negligent acts of its members is
limited to acts committed "in the ordinary course of .. . [its] busi-
ness.''2 This limitation, often used interchangeably with "scope of
employment" or "course of employment," is elusive in meaning, flexible
in application,' and "not susceptible of . . . [successful] analysis."4
As Professor Mechem states: "It is believed that in fact the judicial
process in course-of-employment cases is not unlike that in 'causation'
cases. In novel instances, the court decides on the basis of intuition or
hunch; where similar instances increase, there is a tendency for a rule
to crystallize."5 A similar process of development is apparent in cases
applying this course of employment formula to the negligent acts of an
employee committed while driving home in his employer's vehicle.
1. 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965).
2. MD. CODn ANN. art. 73A, § 13 (1957). This is § 13 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act.
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 69, at 472-73 (3d ed. 1964). In Schloss v. Silverman, 172
Md. 632, 192 Ati. 343 (1937), the Maryland Court of Appeals equated the "course of
the business" test of the liability of a partnership with the "scope of employment"
test of liability for principal and agent.
4. Mscnsa, AcxNcy § 366 (4th ed. 1952).
5. Id. at § 373.
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Several well-defined rules have emerged to deal with the variations
within this limited factual setting.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the use of an employer's
automobile by an employee raises a rebuttable presumption that the
employee was acting within the scope of employment.6 Absent special
circumstances, however, the general rule is that an employer is not
liable for the negligent acts of his employee if committed while driving
the vehicle to his home.7 The cases typically state as grounds for such
a holding that the employee's use of the vehicle was singularly for the
personal convenience of the employee,' conferred no benefit on the
employer," was not within the control, management or direction of the
employer, 10 did not facilitate or expedite the employer's business," or
was without the consent of the employer.' 2 If any one or more of these
factors are present, the employer is vindicated.
On the other hand, if the employer has assigned the employee a
special errand to perform on his way home, the employer will be held
liable until the errand has been performed, even though the errand is
merely incidental to the trip home.'" But if a collision occurs while the
employee is continuing home after having completed the errand, the
decisions are not in harmony. 4
When the employer supplies a vehicle to the employee as an in-
ducement to enter into employment, the employee is generally held to
be acting within the scope of employment while driving home. 15 How-
ever, whether this fact alone requires such a holding is not clear. In
cases where it has been found that the vehicle was an inducement to the
6. See, e.g., Ball v. Hail, 196 Ark. 491, 118 S.W.2d 668 (1938) ; Southern Gas
Corp. v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810, 81 S.E.2d 488 (1954) ; Home Laundry Co. v. Cook,
277 Ky. 8, 125 S.W.2d 763 (1939); Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737
(1957). See generally 9B BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 6065
(1954). But see Beckwith v. Standard Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Mo. 1955),
which criticizes the presumption as attaching undue weight to the employer's owner-
ship of the vehicle.
7. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 350 (1957). Also see RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 229, comment d (1958); 5 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6,
§ 3041.
8. Stenger v. Mitchell, 70 Ga. App. 563, 28 S.E.2d 885 (1944) ; Keck's Adm'r v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 179 Ky. 314, 200 S.W. 452 (1918).
9. Brown v. Bond, 190 Miss. 774, 1 So. 2d 794 (1941); McLamb v. Beasley,
218 N.C. 308, 11 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1940); Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47 A.2d 195
(1946).
10. Cooley v. Tate, 87 Ga. App. 1, 73 S.E.2d 72 (1952) ; Swanson Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson, 79 Ind. App. 321, 138 N.E. 262 (1923).
11. Mauchle v. Panama-Pac. Int'l Exposition Co., 37 Cal. App. 715, 174 Pac.
400 (1918); Donnelly v. Yuille, 197 App. Div. 59, 188 N.Y.S. 603 (1921) ; Gewanski
v. Ellsworth, 166 Wis. 250, 164 N.W. 996 (1917).
12. Frick v. Bickel, 115 Ind. App. 114, 54 N.E.2d 436 (1944) ; Simmons v. James,
210 Miss. 515, 49 So. 2d 839 (1951) ; Arthurs v. Citizens' Coal Co., 37 Ohio L. Abs.
438, 47 N.E.2d 654 (1942) ; Feldtman v. Russak, 141 Wash. 287, 251 Pac. 572 (1926).
13. Gordon v. Bleeck Auto. Co., 233 S.W. 265 (Mo. 1921). See generally StAVEY,
AGENCY § 87 (1964).
14. For cases holding the employer liable, see Brimberry v. Dudfield Lumber Co.,
183 Cal. 454, 191 Pac. 894 (1920) (dissent argued that employer should not be held) ;
Re-Mark Chemical Co. v. Ross, 101 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1958). Contra, Red's Elec. Co.
v. Beasley, 272 Ala. 200, 129 So. 2d 676 (1961) ; Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47
A.2d 195 (1946). See generally 5 BLASHFIRLD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3041.
15. See generally 5 BLASHFLELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3041; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND). AGENCY § 229, comment d (1958) ; Note, 24 TENN. L. Rev. 241, 244 (1956).
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employment contract, the courts have generally made additional find-
ings that the use of the vehicle was advantageous or beneficial to the
operation of the employer's business.'" Yet some courts seem to in-
dicate that such a contract will be sufficient evidence in itself to establish
the employer's liability. 17 However, since no reason has been given to
explain why a contractual obligation to supply a vehicle should alone
support the conclusion that the employer is liable, and since most cases
do advance additional grounds on which to held the employer, it would
seem that a more limited significance should be attached to such a term
in the employment contract. Perhaps the majority of courts are
saying nothing more than that the contractual obligation to provide
a vehicle permits a strong, but not conclusive, inference that its use
benefits the employer's business and is therefore within the employer's
course of business.' 8
It should be noted that the Maryland Court of Appeals in Phillips
v. Cook did not rest its holding solely on the partnership contract.
As additional reasons, the court stated that the car which Harris drove
was for sale at any time, that Harris was always on call at his home,
that he frequently returned to the lot at night, that he had no regular
hours, and that he often conducted business on his way to and from the
lot.' 9 From facts such as these, courts generally will conclude that the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment because his
use of the car facilitated, expedited and thus benefited the employer's
business. Typically stated, the benefit rule is: "[W]here a master
places at the disposal of his servant an automobile to be used by the
servant in going to and from his work, and where the transportation is
beneficial to both, the relation of master and servant continues while
the automobile is used for such purposes .. ."20
A most common application of the benefit rule arises in cases
involving a traveling salesman who uses the employer's vehicle to
cover his sales territory and who returns home directly from his sales
route. In returning home directly from his sales route, the employee
has generally been held to be within the scope of employment." The
same result obtains with deliverymen who drive their employer's vehicle
directly home after the last delivery and continue on their route the next
16. Ely v. Rice Bros., 26 Tenn. App. 19, 167 S.W.2d 355 (1942). See also
Halsey v. Metz, 93 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App. 1936) ; Byrnes v. Poplar Bluff Printing Co.,
74 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. App. 1934), rev'd on other grounds; McLamb v. Beasley, 218
N.C. 308, 11 S.E.2d 283 (1940) (dictum; dissent intimates that repeated use of the
vehicle by the employee raises an implied term in the employment contract.)
17. See, e.g., Ely v. Rice Bros., 26 Tenn. App. 19, 167 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1942).
18. In Halsey v. Metz, 93 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. App. 1936), the court said that
such an inducement to the employment arrangement merely indicates that the opera-
tion of the vehicle is part of the master's work. It is inferable from this that such an
employment arrangement is not conclusively determinative of the employer's liability.
See also 24 TENN. L. Rzv. 241.
19. 239 Md. at 221, 210 A.2d at 747.
20. 5 BLASnVItLD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3041, at 390. See generally Note, 16
OKLA. L. REv. 181, 183 (1963).
21. Krousel v. Thieme, 13 La. App. 680, 128 So. 670 (1930); Burt Corp. v.
Crutchfield, 153 Okla. 2, 6 P.2d 1055 (1931); Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard,
121 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). See generally SE vv, op. cit. supra note 13,
§ 87 and Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 350, 365 (1957).
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day.22 The courts' usual reason for holding the employer liable in these
traveling employee cases is that the elimination of the time-consuming
procedure of having an employee report to his place of business, when
such is not necessary to the conduct of the business, benefits the em-
ployer's business by enabling the employee to work longer hours.23
When the employer supplies the employee with a vehicle so that
he can respond to emergency calls at any time, the employee is gen-
erally held to be within the scope of employment when driving home
from work. 4 Since the employee must keep the employer's vehicle at
home to assure prompt response to a call, the employee is acting for
the employer in getting the vehicle home; and since the employee is
constantly subject to call, he is held to be within the direction and
control of the employer, and a fortiori within the scope of employment.2 5
That an employee has some business function to perform after he
has driven the company car to his home has been sufficient grounds
for holding the employer liable under the benefit theory.2 6 Similarly,
if it is the employee's responsibility to garage the vehicle at his home,
he may be found to be acting within the scope of employment on
the way home.2 7
A number of cases have reasoned that if the use of the employer's
vehicle permits the employee to arrive at work earlier than he other-
wise could, the employer thereby receives a sufficient benefit to hold
him liable for the employee's accidents on his way home. 2  These par-
ticular cases approach the borderline of what the courts will consider
a benefit to the employer, as distinguished from a mere personal accom-
22. C. 3. Horner Co. v. Holland, 207 Ark. 345, 180 S.W.2d 524 (1944); Helena
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Bell, 195 Ark. 435, 112 S.W.2d 416 (1938); Davies v.
Hearn, 45 Ga. App. 276, 164 S.E. 273 (1932). See also Langston v. Harper, 216 Ark.
778, 227 S.W.2d 973 (1950).
23. See, e.g., Helena Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Bell, supra note 22, at 417; Kish
v. California State Auto Ass'n, 190 Cal. 246, 212 Pac. 27 (1922) (dictum).
24. Nelson v. Johnson, 264 Ala. 422, 88 So. 2d 358 (1956) ; Southern Gas Corp.
v. Cowan, 89 Ga. App. 810, 81 S.E. 2d 488 (1954) ; Trachtenberg v. Castillo, 257
S.W. 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). See McLean v. Chicago, G.W.R. Co., 3 Ill. App.
2d 235, 121 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1954), where the court said that such a case was "not
a going to or from work case, since [the employee] was subject to call to work at
all times wherever he was. . . ." See also RWSTATEMXNTr (SEcoND), AGENCY § 233,
comment c (1958) ; 5 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3041, at 392.
25. See, e.g., Southern Gas Corp. v. Cowan, supra note 24.
26. Hall v. Cassell, 79 Ga. App. 7, 52 S.E.2d 639 (1949) (employee was told to
try to sell employer's automobile while he had it at home); Sam Horne Motor &
Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955) (salesman took car home to
demonstrate to prospective customers) ; Barber v. Jewel Tea Co., 252 App. Div. 362,
300 N.Y.S. 302 (1937), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 540, 16 N.E.2d 94 (1938) (employee had
scheduled meeting with a superior at his home). See generally FERSON, AGENCY § 59,
at 85 (1954). See also 5 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3041, at 390, where
it is indicated that the vehicle must have been furnished for the specific purpose of
enabling the employee to respond to night calls. But see Swanson Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson, 79 Ind. App. 321, 138 N.E. 262 (1923).
27. Vitelli v. Minutoli, 118 Cal. App. 120, 4 P.2d 818 (1931) ; Hall v. Puente Oil
Co., 47 Cal. App. 611, 191 Pac. 39 (1920) (dicta). But see Mauchle v. Panama-Pac.
Int'l Exposition Co., 37 Cal. App. 715, 174 Pac. 400 (1918), where the employee did
not ordinarily take the vehicle home and, although the employee garaged the vehicle,
the court held that the employer received no benefit thereby because he had his own
garaging facilities.
28. Blair v. Greene, 247 Ala. 104, 22 So. 2d 834 (1945); Depue v. George P.
Salmon Co., 92 N.J.L. 550, 106 Atl. 379 (1919) ; Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W. Va. 613,
77 S.E.2d 164 (1953). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 350, 370 (1957).
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modation for the employee. Thus, if the use of the vehicle does not
really facilitate the employer's business by enabling the employee to
perform his work in a way which, without the use of the vehicle, he
could not so perform, it is held that the employer has not benefited and
is therefore not liable.2"
For a court to find that an employer has benefited, it generally
seems necessary that a showing be made that the employee's use of
the vehicle facilitates the master's business in an objective, tangibly
measurable way, i.e., a savings in time or money. Therefore, the in-
frequently advanced contention that the benefit theory should apply
where the employer's generosity in permitting the employee the use
of the car has infused their business relation with a spirit of harmony,
cooperation and good will is rejected, because the benefits of the loyalty
engendered thereby are not objectively measurable in a legal sense. 30
There is also a further qualification to the application of the
benefit rule. Should an employee, who might otherwise be acting with-
in the scope of employment in driving home, deviate from the direct
homeward route to pursue personal interests unrelated to the em-
ployer's business, the employer is relieved of liability,3 ' unless the
deviation was so minor and incidental as to be insignificant." How-
ever, an employee who has substantially deviated from the direct route
will, upon his return to the direct route, be held to have resumed
his employment.3 1
In several cases, litigants have attempted to limit the application
of the benefit rule by contending that the employee, in driving home,
was not actuated by a purpose to serve his employer. 34  Usually, the
fact that the employee's immediate intention is merely to get home
does not absolve the employer, as long as the employee's use of the
vehicle meets the requirements of the benefit rule.35  To hold otherwise
would open a Pandora's box of nice inquiries into the specific inten-
tions of the employee and thus virtually give the employee the option
of responding with the most expedient answer about his state of mind."
29. Mauchle v. Panama-Pac. Int'l Exposition Co., 37 Cal. App. 715, 174 Pac. 400
(1918) ; Donnelly v. Yuille, 197 App. Div. 59, 188 N.Y.S. 603 (1921).
30. Gewanski v. Ellsworth, 116 Wis. 250, 164 N.W. 996 (1917). But cf.
Ackerson v. Erwin M. Jennings Co., 107 Conn. 393, 140 At. 760 (1928), which held
that an employee who had been supplied a car for the special purpose of attending a
good will dinner, which was intended to promote harmony and cooperation among the
employer and employees, was within the scope of employment while on the way home
from that dinner.
31. Hall v. Puente Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 611, 191 Pac. 39 (1920) ; Beckwith v.
Standard Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1955) ; Lytle v. Union Gas & Elec. Co., 24
Ohio App. 314, 157 N.E. 804 (1926). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 350, 375
(1957).
32. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Lock Joint Pipe Co., 70 F. Supp. 589 (D. Mo. 1947);
General Foods Corp. v. Coney, 35 Ala. App. 492, 48 So. 2d 781 (1950).
33. See, e.g., Gayton v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 127 Cal. App. 50, 15 P.2d 217
(1932).
34. See, e.g., McGrath v. Wehrle, 233 Mass. 456, 124 N.E. 253 (1919) ; McKeage
v. Morris & Co., 265 S.W. 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (dictum).
35. Hubbard v. Lock Joint Pipe Co., 70 F. Supp. 589 (D. Mo. 1947). See gen-
erally RESTATtM0NT (StcoND), ArFNCY § 236, comment b (1958).
36. Cf. Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 226, 210 A.2d 743, 750 (1965), where the
dissent takes the position that the employer's liability should be determined by in-
quiring into the servant's purposes at the time of the accident. To rest liability solely
on this consideration would amount to a repudiation of the benefit rule.
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Professor Mechem criticizes such an intent test and supplies a more
practicable solution:
In other words we may have to determine his intent from what
he was doing, rather than as an independent factor. This rather
casts doubt on the value of "intent" as a clue or test. The difficulty
can perhaps be eliminated if we adopt a statement like this: the
servant following a pattern designed to achieve the master's ends
will be taken to be intending to serve the master unless for the
time being he is conspicuously and unmistakably seeking a per-
sonal end.3 T
Thus, if the employer benefits by having his employee take the car
home, and the employee does follow a direct route home, the employee
will be held to be acting within the scope of employment, notwith-
standing the fact that the employee's specific intention may be simply
to get home for a good meal.
One aspect of the present case, Phillips v. Cook, however, went
beyond the general case law developments in this particular area and
presents a problem that, while not totally unique, has not been ade-
quately identified and discussed where it has existed in past cases.
The dissent in Phillips seized upon this problem when it distinctly
pointed out the lack of any conclusive proof that Harris, on this par-
ticular occasion, had contemplated any business use of the car before
returning to work the next day."8 Assuming no such business use was
contemplated on the day of the accident, it could be said that the part-
nership was deriving no actual benefit when the automobile was being
driven home, but only a possibility of benefit or a potential benefit
which would accrue only if an unforeseen contingency arose, requiring
the business use of the car on the night of the accident. In essence,
the dissent argues that a distinction between an actual and potential
benefit should be made. The majority can be said to have concluded
the contrary, sub silentio. The majority has probably taken the sounder
position in disregarding this distinction. The mere availability of the
automobile to facilitate a spot sale or to provide for some other unfore-
seen business contingency is certainly in the best interest of the part-
nership; and if Harris, as a partner, acted to insure that availability
by driving the vehicle home, there seems no sensible reason why the
partnership should not be held liable under the benefit rule. 9
37. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, § 368, at 248.
38. 239 Md. 215, 224, 210 A.2d 743, 749 (Hammond, J., dissenting). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 235 (1958).
39. The argument of the dissent is further weakened by a close examination of
its authorities. The force of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 238, comment b
(1958), on which the dissent relies, is both mitigated and attentuated when read in
light of the discussion of scope of employment problems elsewhere: Compare § 238,
comment d and § 229, comment d. Furthermore, in assigning 51 A.L.R.2d 120, 128-30,
as authority, the dissent failed to note that the section applied to cases where the use
was contrary to instructions by the employer. The dissent in citing 53 A.L.R.2d 631,
655-61, which also is not directly in point, failed to note the annotations commencing
on p. 663, which are directly in point and contrary to its argument. Similarly, the
cases cited by the dissent also reveal a lack of factual identity with the case before
the court.
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Finally, it should be noted that legislation extant in a number of
states renders moot this entire legal problem. Under so-called permis-
sive use statutes, an owner of a vehicle is "liable for injuries to third
persons caused by the negligence of any person... , who is operating the
car on the public highway with the owner's consent."40 Where such
legislation is in effect, an inquiry into the doctrine herein discussed is
avoided.4 Maryland has no such statute, but with the decision in
Phillips v. Cook, the benefit rule is made sufficiently broad to be nearly
the judicial equivalent of such legislation as to employer's liability.
Technical Trade Secrets And Former Employees
Space Aero Products Co. v. R. E. Darling Co.'
Darling, the plaintiff, manufactures oxygen breathing hoses for
aircraft personnel. Four of the defendants were former employees
who had worked for a number of years for Darling in various capacities.
The former employees had no formal contract of employment and could
leave or be discharged at any time. In the fall of 1960, the former
employees decided to go into business in competition with Darling.
With financial backing from a former supplier of silicone products to
Darling, the defendant Space Aero Products was incorporated in
December, 1960, by the former employees, who resigned from Darling
between December 9 and December 23 of that year. Darling had
been the sole manufacturer and supplier of certain types of oxygen
breathing hoses for the U.S. Navy and had been working since April,
1960, to qualify hose under a certain military specification. Space
Aero began business operations in January, 1961; its first hose was
the same as Darling's and was built by some of the same people. Space
Aero's hose was qualified under the specification in the middle of
January, 1961, and was submitted to the Navy on February 20, 1961,
over two months ahead of the first hose Darling submitted. In May,
1961, the Navy accepted Space Aero's hose.
Darling filed suit against the defendants to enjoin them from
using the alleged trade secrets of the plaintiff in the manufacture of
the oxygen breathing hoses. The trial judge found that the former
employees had acquired the "know-how" to set up a competing busi-
40. PROSSER, TORTS § 72, at 500 (3d ed. 1964). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §§ 26.10, 26.16 (1956). Also see RESTATEM4NT (StcoND), AGENCY § 238,
comments b, d (1958).
41. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP § 54, at 281 (1952), which states that under a per-
missive use statute "partnership liability results from operation for nonpartnership
purposes by a partner with consent of his co-partner."
1. 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
19661
